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On the Road to Affirmation: Facilitating Urban Resilience in the Americas 
 
Abstract 
This article explores how international policy elites rationalize intervention 
by trying to go beyond the neoliberal critique of universalist knowledge and 
top-down governance. In the enabling neoliberal policy projects of the 
2000s, international policymakers were banned from imposing substantive 
policy solutions from above, but were considered (uniquely) capable of 
putting in place the facilitating framework through which local actors could 
produce context sensitive policy responses. The reason is that, although 
neoliberal policy rejected simplistic universalist notions of the subject, 
market and the state, it continued to operate through a range of reductionist 
assumptions, concepts and categories, such as bounded rationality, the 
rational design of incentives and a core set of liberal normative aspirations. 
In contrast, the resilience discourse seems to be set on overcoming the 
remaining analytical reductionism of neo-liberal policy frameworks. What 
are the implications for international policy engagement in the Global South 
of this much more radical critique? How do international policymakers 
think about facilitating local agency if the knowledge premises which made 
them an agential self in international relations disappear? The paper 
investigates these questions with reference to the evolution of crime-related 
US security interventions in the Americas, recurring especially on the 
Merida Initiative.  
 
Introduction 
While conducting fieldwork on urban resilience in Mexico City in November 2017, a new 
map-based security app called SWALK caught my attention.1 According to its designers, 
SWALK uses real-time data provided by individual users and police reports to locate and 
categorize instances of street crime in urban centres, like Mexico City, allowing travellers to 
identify the ‘safe route to [their] destination’.2 In an interview with one of its co-founders, I 
later found out that the underlying idea of crowd-sourcing projects like SWALK is to work on 
                                                          





problems of public (in-) security without relying on preconceived analytical models or causal 
theories.3 In this way, SWALK seems to be a showcase example of a new governance ethos – 
hostile even to neo-liberal concepts like bounded rationality and the notion of a well-designed 
incentive structure inducing collectively beneficial outcomes. The goal of this article is to 
draw out the genealogy of this paradigm by engaging critically with the resilience discourse. 
The guiding question is, how does the increasingly influential resilience discourse rationalize 
the practice of international governing. That is, how does the idea of local communities as 
innovative,  self-organizing, and  adaptive change contemporary governmental thinking. 
Specifically, this paper discusses how US security discourse on drug-related organized crime 
and violence in the Americas criticizes liberal-universal4 episteme, hollowing out 
international policy agency. It starts by discussing traditional US counternarcotics policy, 
centred on law enforcement and interdiction. The so-called War on Drugs was premised on 
the rather crude idea of dismantling trafficking organisations directly and heavily punishing 
consumers. This one-size-fits-all, top-down approach put US policymakers and security 
agencies on the spot: It was their political preferences which counted in international security 
cooperation. US Americans called the shots in the War on Drugs and were, thus, seen as 
responsible for its negative side-effects, including human rights abuses, unchecked 
presidential powers and escalating street violence. In the 2000s, US policy thinking on 
organized crime in the region began to change notably in reaction to these negative 
unintended consequences. More importantly, the critiques of narrowly conceived technical 
assistance claimed that there were deeper social-cultural deficits within Latin American 
societies which drove the narcotics trade.  
As the second section shows, this critique gave rise to neo-liberal5 capacity building projects, 
like the Culture of Lawfulness. The Culture of Lawfulness claims that effective state law 
                                                          
3 Interview with Rodrigo Hortega, SWALK. 
4 In this article, the term liberal refers to the ‘political philosophy of universal rights 
derived from rational and self-interested selves and associated forms of state’ (Harrison, 
Graham, The World Bank in Africa. The Construction of Governance States. London: 
Routledge, 2004, p. 44). This approach starts from the idea that individuals are strategically 
calculating agents who are able to correctly interpret their environment and compute the 
(perfect) information they receive. 
5 In this article, the term ‘neo-liberal’ denotes those governmental practices which are geared 
towards the rational design of incentives in order to induce collectively beneficially choices. 
Rather than equipping the subject with a set of universal, substantive characteristics, as classic 
liberals do, neo-liberals see the subject as the social product of its environment. As Foucault 
writes, neo-liberalism works on the ‘milieu’ within which decision-making subjects are 
embedded in order to stimulate collectively beneficial individual choices (Michel Foucault, 
The Birth of Biopolitics. New York: Picador, 2004, p. 245). 
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requires certain ‘psychosocial skills’ which have to be cultivated deliberately from the 
outside.6 At the same time, this approach recognizes that policy has to be owned locally and 
resonate with context-specific identities and histories. The liberal-universal episteme in which 
international organisations and leading Western governments are immersed is of limited use 
here. Effective and legitimate policy solutions may only come from within the particular 
socio-cultural context, while also requiring external care. This put international interveners in 
an awkward position. While they were no longer able to authoritatively impose specific policy 
items, they still needed to guide autochthonous political processes into a specific (liberally 
acceptable) direction. In consequence, international governance took on an indirect mediated 
character, working through the agency of the intervened. Governmentality studies have turned 
this contradictory relation to non-Western agency and non-liberal episteme into their favourite 
object of critique. They argue that behind the benign rhetoric of local ownership and 
empowerment lies the continued predominance of liberal-universal episteme.  
As the last section draws out, the recently emerging resilience discourse tries to discard the 
remnants of modern, reductionist thinking in bottom-up forms of governing, considering them 
the cause of recurring policy failure. Similar to classic neo-liberal approaches, resilience 
thinking tries to adjust the practice of governing as far as possible to the actually-existing 
world, to what is thought to exist in reality. In so doing, it works towards affirming the world 
we live in, rather than purposefully transforming or, indeed, governing it. However, resilience 
does not represent an entirely new episteme since it continues to identify societal problems – 
and, in consequence, needs to make normative judgements about policy success and failure.    
 
Liberal Intervention: The War on Drugs as Overbearing Self-Imposition 
In the context of drug-related organized crime in the Americas, US security thinking has 
traditionally followed a heavy-handed War on Drugs logic. The basic idea behind the War on 
Drugs is that ‘drugs themselves’ constitute a security ‘threat to American society’ and that 
this menace can be effectively countered by ‘restricting the supply of drugs’ and ‘aggressively 
prosecuting’ those involved.7 From Plan Colombia in the 1990s to contemporary assistance 
programmes like the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), US security 
discourse on drug-related organized crime in the Americas has articulated a strong legal 
                                                          
6 México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, Desarollo de Una Cultura de La Legalidad En 
México (Mexico City: México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, 2013), p. 3, author´s translation. 
7 Raúl Benítez, ‘The Geopolitics of Insecurity in Mexico-United States Relations’, in Brian 
Bow and Arturo Santa-Cruz (eds.), The State and Security in Mexico. Transformation and 
Crisis in Regional Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 83. 
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problematic, suggesting a set of repressive policing and penal responses.8 By way of example, 
we may briefly look at the early stages of the Merida Initiative, a US-Mexican security 
agreement signed in 2007 and now considered the ‘centrepiece of the US Government´s 
security cooperation with Mexico’.9 Initially, policymakers in the Merida Initiative intended 
to fight transnational criminal organisations in Mexico ‘head on’10 by strengthening the 
‘institutional capacities’ of the Mexican federal government and security apparatus.11 
Accordingly, US policy revolved around providing ‘new detection technologies and improved 
equipment’, in the hope that this would increase the amount of arrests and drug seizures.12 At 
this stage, Merida was a classic technical assistance programme centred on equipment 
deliveries, information exchange and professional training for members of the military, police 
and judicial system – rather reminiscent of the popular HBO series The Wire, where door 
busting policemen arrest drug dealers on end without ever being able to effectively curb 
supply.13  
The point is that the War on Drugs is based on a rather straightforward rational-choice model 
in which government policies are meant to dissuade strategically calculating actors from 
engaging in a socially harmful economic exchange.14 While interdiction and law enforcement 
will raise the market prize for illicit substances to such a level that consumption becomes 
unattractive, heavy punishments and a high conviction rate are expected to dissuade potential 
suppliers from entering the market. From this simplistic, one-size-fits-all understanding of the 
subject and the political and socio-economic issue that is violent drug-related organized crime 
flows a coherent and standardized set of policies – to be implemented from the top-down by 
an all-knowing, technically competent international agent. The hubris of this security 
paradigm comes out nicely when looking at how US policy elites reacted to the critique that 
militarized assistance was causing negative unintended consequences in recipient countries. 
                                                          
8 Contrary to popular perception, a comprehensive statebuilding project accompanied U.S. 
law enforcement and interdiction efforts in Colombia. 
9 Assistant Secretary Alan Bersin, Department of Homeland Security, in U.S. Congress, The 
Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security, 57. 
10 Rosa Acevedo, ‘Stepping Up the Merida Initiative: Community Policing as a Foundation 
for Building Resilient Communities and Reforming The Rule of Law in Mexico’, California 
Western International Law, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2014), p.231. 
11 Benítez, ‘The Geopolitics of Insecurity’, op.cit., p. 34; see Office of the Spokesman, U.S. 
Department of State, Joint Statement on the Merida Initiative (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of State, 2007). 
12 Benítez, ‘The Geopolitics of Insecurity’, op.cit., p. 34. 
13 Ibid., p. 35. 
14The War on Drugs approach rearticulates the liberal-universal paradigm because it focuses 
on the strategic action of rationally calculating agents with correct mental models. 
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For example, Laura Carlsen15 from the Center for International Policy, a Washington-based 
human rights advocacy group, claimed that US counter-narcotics aid was providing ‘abusive 
security forces’ with ‘unchecked power’ and was boosting ‘authoritarian presidential powers’. 
The reason, Carlsen16 argued, was that US decision-makers and line agencies were unable to 
‘tell the good guys from the bad guys’ and were shifting traditional policing duties to the 
military. Importantly, in line with their universalist rationalist framing, for US policymakers 
ensuring accountability was an entirely technical, best-practice issue, not requiring specialist 
country knowledge. For the State Department, it merely entailed designing and implementing 
‘sound practices’ for ‘screening candidates’ and the ‘periodic re-investigation of active duty 
employees’.17 As far as the control of presidential powers was concerned, the answer was seen 
in constitutional checks and balances, civilian oversight of the military and the abolition of 
separate jurisdictions for members of the military. Here, it becomes apparent how a liberal-
universal18, rationalist framing of the drug issue portrays governance problems as open to 
technical solution while placing international interveners in a clearly visible governing 
position.  
By pursuing one-size-fits-all technical solutions, the War on Drugs model resonates strongly 
with the post-conflict operations of the early 1990s which saw the state in idealized, 
functional terms as a ‘depoliticised, bureaucratic form[...] of political rule’.19 In this view, 
state institutions could be built or strengthened deliberately by external actors and even ‘taken 
over temporarily by international administrations’.20 The technical assistance programs of the 
War on Drugs parallel liberal peacebuilding missions in that both assume a ‘state-centric terra 
nullius and open season on institutional invention’.21 The epistemic problem of intervention is 
one of insufficient theoretical knowledge on the part of international actors – of ‘refining what 
to do and how to do it’.22 The underlying liberal-universalist episteme itself is not questioned. 
                                                          
15 Laura Carlsen, A Primer on Plan Mexico (Washington, D.C.: Center for International 
Policy, 2008). 
16 Laura Carlsen, Perils of Plan Mexico: Going Beyond Security to Strengthen U.S.-Mexico 
Relations (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, 2009). 
17 U.S. Department of State, Mexican Federal Registry of Police Personnel (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), p.4. 
18 This article uses the term liberal-universal to describe this practice because it engages with 
subjects as instrumentally calculating actors with one single (correct) rationality. 
19 Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘The State in Times of Statebuilding’, Civil Wars, Vol. 10, 
No. 4 (2008), p. 348. 
20 Ibid., p. 348. 
21 Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, in Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson 




It would seem that, originally, international interveners tended to see subjects in transitional 
societies ‘according to how they saw themselves: as liberal or Wilsonian’.23 In this 
perspective, localities were ‘analytically significant only in terms of the extent to which they 
follow[ed] an externally-imposed model’.24 As the next section draws out, this traditional 
liberal-universal episteme has become the target of critique and is now increasingly perceived 
as ineffective and illegitimate.  
 
Neo-Liberal Intervention: The Culture of Lawfulness as Mediated International 
Governance 
Although law enforcement and interdiction remain important elements of US security policy 
in the Americas, it seems as if the ‘energy’ and self-confidence underlying the War on Drugs 
have ‘dissipated’.25 As former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in a much-noticed 
press conference on the Merida Initiative, ‘clearly what we have been doing has not 
worked’.26 Here, it becomes clear how previous policy failure drives the discourse. There 
seems to be a growing recognition among US policymakers that simplified models like the 
War on Drugs only work on the ‘most visible manifestations of the drug trade’, that there are 
‘deeper, more difficult issues that drive that business’.27 Rather than focusing on ‘big ticket 
equipment’ deliveries, US policymakers are increasingly framing international security aid to 
Latin America in terms of addressing a ‘broad range of needs outside of law enforcement and 
the judiciary’, such as gang prevention, secondary school education and public outreach.28 
Instead of engaging with the drug issue through a highly reductionist analytics and a cookie-
cutter set of policies, it would appear as if US security practitioners nowadays are a lot more 
concerned about the social, cultural and political ‘deficits’ of particular societies.29 
                                                          
23 Heathershaw, ‘Seeing like the International Community: How Peacebuilding Failed (and 
Survived) in Tajikistan’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2008), p. 
329. 
24 Ibid., p. 347. 
25 Interview with John Walsh, Washington Office on Latin America, Washington, D.C. 
26 in Landler, ‘Clinton Says U.S. Feeds Mexico Drug Trade’. 
27 Hal Brands, Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy (Carlisle: U.S. Army 
War College, 2009), p. 35. 
28 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
Merida Initiative: Myth vs. Fact (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009). 
29 Eric Olson, David Shirk, and Duncan Wood, ‘Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: 
Civic Responses to Crime and Violence’, in David Shirk, Duncan Wood, and Eric Olson 
(eds.), Building Resilient Communities in Mexico: Civic Responses to Crime and Violence 
(Washington, D.C. and San Diego: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and 
University of San Diego, 2014), p. 2. At this point, it should be emphasized that the War on 
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An illustrative case of the new emphasis on social context is the Culture of Lawfulness (CoL) 
approach.30 It claims that ‘training judges and prosecutors, rewriting laws and building 
investigative facilities for police are not sufficient’.31 Effective state institutions require 
‘societal support’32 – an ‘ethos sympathetic to the rule of law’.33 The critics of purely technical 
assistance policies, like those of the War on Drugs, argued that corruption was not simply a 
‘government problem’, i.e. a formal-legal, administrative issue.34 It was a ‘social problem’.35 
‘Lawlessness’ was caused by path-dependent ‘historic practices’ which needed to be altered 
before state institutions could be expected to work properly.36 In stark contrast to the War on 
Drug´s depoliticised, decontextualized notion of bureaucratic capacity, the Culture of 
Lawfulness approach suggests that sound public institutions ‘on paper’37 are not enough: ‘It 
does not matter how well designed and administered they might be; these institutions cannot 
work in a vacuum’.38 They need a ‘psychosocial’ transformation of the population.39 In the 
CoL view, anti-corruption entails changing the ‘widespread public perception’ of what is 
considered ‘normal’.40 If ordinary citizens are ‘equipped’ with the correct ‘values and 
attitudes’ they will simply ‘reject’ or ‘marginalize illegal behaviour’.41 Rather than 
modernizing Mexican law enforcement, the CoL discourse intends to re-centre US security 
policy on the ‘management of cultural factors’, trying to bring about a ‘fundamental shift in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Drugs logic remains influential in the Merida Initiative. As Eric Olson from the Wilson 
Center pointed out in an interview: ‘Still there is enormous pressure in Congress to see this 
narrowly as a security issue that is about support to law enforcement and the military’ 
(interview with the author in April 2010). 
30 Until recently, the Culture of Lawfulness program was implemented in several countries by 
the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC), a US-based NGO. 
31 National Strategy Information Center, Fostering a Culture of Lawfulness. Multi-Sector 
Success in Pereira, Colombia. 2008-2010 (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2011), p. 1. 
32 Ibid., 1. 
33 Roy Godson, ‘Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Security’, in Michael Brown (ed.), 
Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2003), p. 272. 
34 Paula Dobriansky, Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of State, 2004). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Lawfulculture.org, What Is the Culture of Lawfulness?(2013). 
38 México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, op. cit., p. 2, author´s translation. 
39 Ibid., p. 3, author´s translation. 
40 Godson, ‘Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Security’, op. cit., p. 267. 
41 México Unido Contra la Delincuencia, op. cit., p. 3–4, author´s translation. 
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values’.42 The Culture of Lawfulness approach means that effective state institutions depend 
on a particular socio-cultural context which cannot to be assumed a priori, but needs to be 
carefully and artificially cultivated. 
What matters for the purposes of this article is that sociologizing discourses, like the Culture 
of Lawfulness, involve a notion of complex endogenous causation. The causes of violence 
and insecurity in Latin America are idiosyncratic, depending on the specific socio-historical 
and cultural context. While these informal social dynamics and practices are meant to be 
reformed in line with normative standards of the rule of law, good governance and human 
rights, they operate ‘out of reach or vision of Western policy-makers and linear social 
theories’.43 In this way, the CoL discourse formulates a critique of liberal-universal episteme, 
inviting policymakers to open up to cultural diversity and historical specificity. It is a 
textbook example of how neo-liberal policy discourse is cohered through a critique of classic 
liberal episteme.44 
In neo-liberal frameworks, like the Culture of Lawfulness, agency, i.e. the ability to identify 
and implement effective and legitimate policy solutions, is weirdly split between international 
interveners and local agents. The former are imagined as benevolent, but inherently limited by 
their liberal-universal background, while the latter are imagined as holding unique non-
Western forms of knowledge, in need of outside guidance.45 In this view, international 
capacity builders may supervise and help redesign (formal) processes, but they can no longer 
prescribe substantive policy solutions or specific programme items. Only genuinely local 
actors – ‘local-locals’ – have the relevant insider understanding necessary to formulate 
pertinent responses.46 This view is clearly reflected in contemporary policy thinking on 
international intervention which foregrounds ‘national [...] responsibility’ and recognizes the 
‘limits to what international support can do’.47 It is also emblematic for academic studies 
                                                          
42 Roy Godson, Guide to Developing a Culture of Lawfulness (Palermo: Organization of 
American States, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, 2000), p. 3; Godson, 
‘Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Security’, op. cit., p. 271. 
43 Chandler, ‘Beyond Neoliberalism: Resilience, the New Art of Governing Complexity’, p. 
85. 
44 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (New 
York: Picador, 2004). 
45 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace’. Conflict and 
Cooperation, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008), p. 139–63. 
46 Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011).  
47 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Conflict (New York: United Nations, 2009), p. 4; World Bank, World 
Development Report. Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2011), p. 205; see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Concepts and 
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which ‘put[...] the burden on the aid recipients to [...] take responsibility’.48 For example, 
statebuilding theorists Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur have 
popularized the idea that ‘states cannot be made to work from the outside’ and that ‘local 
actors’ should see this ‘as an opportunity to seize responsibility’.49 In neo-liberal ownership 
frameworks, international efforts can only work indirectly, through the agency of the 
intervened. 
Hence, neo-liberal framings place international policymaker in a contradictory position. 
While it is emphasized that policy solutions have to emerge endogenously from below, it is 
also understood that local actors require enabling external care to ensure that basic normative 
benchmarks are met. Neo-liberal knowledge discourse reflects this ambivalence. On the one 
hand, it focuses on creative grassroots agency and the harmfulness of liberal-universalist 
thinking. On the other hand, it depends on a range of ‘value-loaded metaphors and 
dichotomies’.50 Despite the fact that policy responses have to be formulated locally, the CoL 
discourse privileges a ‘particular kind of associational life relating in particular kinds of ways 
to the state’.51 The intention is to help produce a liberally acceptable politics. Governmentality 
studies have rightly pointed out that, even though neo-liberal discourse puts local ownership 
centre-stage, civil society remains a ‘constructed realm’ in which ‘certain kinds of 
associational life are to be reworked or even eliminated and other forms encouraged’.52 
Governmentality studies have put forward a powerful critique of the ‘new interventionism’53 
by showing how neo-liberal discourse reinstates a problematic binary ‘along the lines of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience’, OECD 
Journal on Development, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009), p. 70. 
48 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Building Democracy After Conflict: “Stateness First”’, Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2005), p. 86. 
49 Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur, ‘Introduction: Making States 
Work’, in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Making States 
Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
2005), pp. 1–10; for a critique, see Cunliffe, ‘State-Building. Power without Responsibility’, 
in Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson (eds.), State-Building. Theory and Practice (London: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 50–69; David Chandler, Empire in Denial. The Politics of State-
Building (London: Pluto Press, 2006). 
50 Laura Zanotti, ‘Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: The UN 
Debate on Democratization and Good Governance’, Alternatives, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2005), p. 
481. 
51 David Williams, ‘Civil Society and the Liberal Project in Ghana and Sierra Leone’, Journal 
of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012), p. 9. 
52 Ibid., 9. 
53 Simon Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transnational Administration, 
and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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metropolitan, civilised world versus disorderly borderlands’.54 International policy discourses 
of empowerment and local ownership reject liberal-universalist episteme, while hinging on a 
division between ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed’ subjects.55 Although they invalidate 
rationalist, one-size-fits-all notions of the subject, state and the market, they articulate a 
‘boundary [...] separat[ing] those who claim how others should live from those whose conduct 
is to be conducted’.56  
Where this study differs from the governmentality perspective is in how policymakers are 
seen to react to failure. According to governmentality authors, learning from policy failure 
involves reinvigorating liberal-universal episteme, rather than questioning it. For them, 
liberal-universal episteme is continuously reaffirmed as ‘authoritative knowledge’, incessantly 
entrenching the position of international elites as ‘expert[s] with the power to diagnose and 
correct a deficit of power in someone else’.57 Judged by the deteriorating legitimacy of 
traditional technical assistance programmes and the rationalist framings that undergirded 
them, it would seem as if the opposite trend is in play. For international policy elites engaged 
in post-conflict and other transitional societies, local empowerment appears to be an 
agonizing process in which the failure of intervention brings home the need to deconstruct 
oneself further. The repeated lesson learnt is that external policies are still too crude, too one-
size-fits-all, too top-down. What emerges in this ideological environment is a competition to 
be as non-reductionist and non-imposing as possible – a secular trend of anti-universalist 
critique.58 The following section draws out how the recently emerging resilience discourse 
radicalizes this development – trying to go beyond neo-liberalism, but ultimately failing to do 
so. 
 
Facilitating Urban Resilience: The Rise of Self-Less Governance 
                                                          
54 Zanotti, op. cit., p. 481; Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 
Governing the World of Peoples (Malden: Polity Press, 2007). 
55 Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy. Development Discourse and Good Governance 
in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 193. 
56 Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve. Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of 
Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 281–82. 
57 Ibid., p. 275. 
58 Peter Finkenbusch, Rethinking Neo-Institutional Statebuilding. The Knowledge Paradox of 
International Statebuilding (London: Routledge, 2017); Peter Finkenbusch, ‘Governing 
through Critique: Post-Conditionality and Bottom-Up Governance in the Merida Initiative’, 
Globalizations, Vol. 14, No. 6 (2017), pp. 896–910. 
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In US security policy in the Americas, the notion of  facilitating resilience is increasingly 
popular.59 In the Merida Initiative, for example, there has been a growing focus on community 
resilience, with the aim of buttressing the capacity of the people to adapt to situations of 
chronic violence.60 What stands out in Merida´s policy documents and government reports on 
community resilience is how appreciative and open they are towards actually existing local 
practices. In Merida´s $90 million flagship Programme for Citizen Cohabitation (Programa de 
Convivencia Ciudadana, PCC), local communities ‘have the capacity to transform harm into 
hope and silence into purposive approaches’.61 They are entirely able to ‘self-develop [...] 
without’ a ‘facilitator or external organization’.62 Rather than bringing something of their 
own, international facilitators are meant to ‘potentiat[e] latent capacities’.63 Instead of 
imposing their own normative expectations of efficient public services, state law and 
universal rights, policymakers should start with the ‘real problems recognized by the 
communities’.64 
In a much-cited USAID report on ‘Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence’, 
Harvard professor and leading Latin Americanist Diane Davis suggests a ‘pragmatic 
approach’ which reinforces what is already developing on the ground rather than trying to 
curb it into conformity with state law.65 Whereas neo-liberal ownership had to operate within 
a truncated corset of reductionist concepts and categories, like bounded rationality, resilience 
                                                          
59 U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID’S Progress in Pillars II and IV of the 
Merida Initiative (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2011); 
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is interested in ‘real communities’ and how their ‘grounded knowledge’ is already allowing 
them to survive.66 Neo-liberal discourses, like the Culture of Lawfulness, saw local practice as 
deviant and problematic, while resilience actively seeks out and embraces ‘actions already 
taken’.67 According to Davis, the ‘originating premise’ of resilience is ‘how actors and 
institutions have comported themselves’, rather than how their socio-institutional context 
might be redesigned in order to incentivise better choices.68 Policy discourse on facilitating 
urban resilience makes a deliberate effort not to start with its own analytical model of the 
subject or the causes of violent crime. It is the ‘ways that actors [...] at the level of the 
community actually cope with or adapt to chronic urban violence’ that the proponents of 
resilience are looking for.69 In Davis´ discussion of urban resilience, real-life processes and 
practices take precedence over artificial policy analysis. Writing an instructor´s ‘guide’ – as 
the advocates of a Culture of Lawfulness did – would seem to make little sense in a resilience 
framing.70 Resilience refers to the unscripted, improvised, evolving practices of real people in 
their everyday life situations. It hints at all the things that escape the modernist gaze of urban 
planners, security experts and state bureaucrats and cannot be built instrumentally, no matter 
how bottom-up the framework. Resilience thinking has realized that ‘human realities’ will 
always be ‘more complex’ than any analytical concept.71 Resilience policy is about engaging 
with a constantly emerging ‘dynamic reality which can be observed day-by-day’, rather than 
about developing a more context-sensitive analytical apparatus or a more inclusive policy 
process.72 Rather than intruding on local communities with a re-education campaign in civics, 
international policy support becomes a matter of ‘creating spaces for sharing knowledge and 
information among networks of those most affected by violence’.73 
While neo-liberal frameworks, like the Culture of Lawfulness, related to local knowledge in 
an exploitative way, i.e. as a resource to better implant liberal notions of law, the market and 
the state, knowledge in a resilience framing seems to be of a different kind. Knowledge in a 
resilience framing is local in a different way. It is ‘situate[d]’ in the ‘everyday-life world’ of 
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subjects and communities.74 It cannot be extracted out of the lived experience of real people, 
the intimate social relations that bind them together and the intricate historical traditions that 
make each community a unique social organism. As Pol Bargués-Pedreny usefully highlights, 
in the resilience discourse ‘no representation can exhaust the rich diversity of human life’.75 
There is no way to know local things the way they were known by neo-liberals. No fine-
grained, long-term anthropological study will ever be able to systematize the practices and 
relations that make a particular community resilient. In fact, any attempt to do so would only 
‘tempt[...]’ policymakers to fall back on counterproductive ‘modernist techniques of social 
and spatial control’.76 What is at stake in resilience discourse is not a more participatory, 
bottom-up policy process – governed by the same stripped-down neo-liberal policy episteme. 
It is an ‘alternative way of generating knowledge about violence’.77 Resilience appears to be 
set on doing away with what remained modern-reductionist about neo-liberal policy 
discourse. The goal of this much more radical critique is to inverse the disciplinary hierarchy 
of neo-liberal forms of governing, so that policymakers may actually ‘learn from the ways 
that citizens in real communities are responding and changing their everyday behaviour in the 
face of violence’.78 
Here, the task of international facilitators is to support local communities without ‘distorting 
or dominating’ their everyday practices and routine modes of living.79 The biggest danger for 
international actors is to impose their own models and preferences. While the Culture of 
Lawfulness openly distinguished between the ‘values of a given social order [read bad, 
dysfunctional] and universal ethics [read good, functional]’, the resilience discourse 
problematizes the idea of evaluating autochthonous processes according to rule of law, good 
governance and human rights norms.80 Relevant ‘priorities’ can only be formulated ‘by those 
who live in the situations of violence’.81 In this way, the resilience approach is far less 
problem-centred or judgemental than the Culture of Lawfulness framing. Indeed, resilience is 
not interested in ‘crime and violence per se’, but in the ‘ways that citizens [...] have actually 
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responded’.82 The fact that neo-liberal empowerment initiatives tried to smuggle in their own 
normative ideas is seen with disdain. Rather than doing a better job at installing liberal forms 
of social organization by incorporating and building on local ideas and identities, resilience 
turns the ‘direction of causality’ around.83 It demands that international policymakers gain a 
‘better understanding’ of the ‘small but promising victories already being [...] won in the 
struggle to survive’.84 In sum, resilience thinking abnegates self-possessed international policy 
agency. 
If resilience warns international policymakers against distorting local adaptive processes by 
imposing their own normative standards and reductionist analysis, what is their active role? 
As Davis´ argumentation makes clear, there is nothing of their own making that international 
policymakers could possibly contribute. However, they may assist the ‘community´s own 
autonomous actions’ by propping up ‘existent forces and conditions’.85 The central challenge 
is to do so without recurring on counterproductive liberal narratives of the free market, 
centralized state authority, representative party politics and law-based security. The central 
practical challenge is to ‘identify’ innovative coping strategies and plus them up with 
additional resources.86 However, since the very nature of these strategies is that they are 
invisible to the modern rationalist eye and inaccessible to instrumentalist policy, finding and 
supporting them demands that international policymakers undo their own liberal baggage and 
help others do so as well. There is a lot of work to be done in facilitating ‘self-directed 
processes’ because this has to be done without falling back on liberal notions of self-control, 
reductionist social theory and purpose political action.87 Only then will unexpected, accidental 
‘innovations’ become the ‘starting point’ of policy.88 Resilience is an invitation to ‘learn from 
the trenches’.89 However, this learning exercise will only work if it involves a genuine desire 
to abandon ‘any larger security mandate set by the government’.90 In short, there is a huge 
governance challenge ahead, but it entails questioning one´s own analytical assumptions and 
political abilities, rather than pursuing a self-formulated ideological mission.  
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Governing Crime without Causation 
However, the resilience discourse does not break entirely with the notion of intervening 
insociety according to basic normative expectations.  It still formulates a rudimentary 
normative governance agenda. Thus, while overcoming many of the reductionist concepts of 
traditional neo-liberal governance and being generally more open to the world the way it 
presents itself, resilience does not make the transition to affirmation. For that it would be 
necessary to surrender the normative expectation of non-violence. Resilience appreciates the 
world in its rich plurality and radical contingency – without, however, giving up entirely 
certain normative preferences. 91 . As Davis states, the explicit ‘goal’ should be to ‘restore 
urban liveability in situations of chronic violence’.92 Similarly,  prominent US policy thinkers 
Eric Olson, David Shirk and Duncan Wood discuss resilience as an innovative approach to 
address ‘problems of crime and violence’.93 Thus, there is an idea of ‘normalcy’ lingering in 
the background entailing non-violence, accountability and sustainability.94 If resilience can 
still be ‘negative’, ‘vigilantism, lynching, or other extra-judicial actions’ naturally appear as 
illegitimate.95 Resilience thinking reproduces a rudimentary idea of policy success. While the 
resilience discourse accepts that complex real life is unamendable to instrumentalist forms of 
governing, including those working indirectly from the bottom-up, there is still a struggle to 
improve the human condition: Resilient communities are ‘able to respond effectively and 
build back better than before’.96 This empirical finding stands in contrast to the more 
philosophical claim that resilience introduces ‘a world in which everything we thought under 
liberal modernity needs to be re-evaluated’, that resilience abnegates all ‘liberal aspirations 
for progress’.97 In terms of this Special Issue, the fact that resilient communities are expected 
to behave according to basic normative standards means that the discourse still has a strong 
neoliberal, rather than affirmative, character.98 This is what makes it a governmental 
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rationality with all the ensuing points of critique formulated by governmentality authors.99 
The effects include hierarchy, exclusion and normative bias.  
Importantly, unlike the Culture of Lawfulness approach which tried to address underlying 
causes, couched in terms of deficient cultural norms and practices, resilience no longer 
‘focus[es] on completely eliminating the deep roots of violence’.100 It contents itself with 
adapting better. Crisis or ‘non-equilibrium’ are unavoidable characteristics of the world and 
need to be accepted.101 Policy should, therefore, strive to ‘mitigate, adapt to and recover from 
shocks and stresses’.102 A good example of this adaptive governance ethos uninterested in 
causality is the smart phone app SWALK.103  
SWALK is a smartphone application mapping incidents of street crime in order to ‘suggest a 
safe route [...] telling you where to be careful and where you are safe’.104 It uses both official 
police data as well as reports submitted by individuals to record the location of particular 
events, define their threat level for specific types of travellers, such as pedestrians, cyclists or 
car drivers, and plot a safe route to their destination.105 According to one of its designers, 
SWALK is a way of ‘crowd funding’ information in ‘real time’ to determine whether a 
particular zone is dangerous or not, allowing people to make adjustments to their travel 
route.106 SWALK does not propose its own model on the causes of violent urban crime in the 
Americas. Nevertheless, it is able to generate ‘many insights’ on the patterns and correlations 
of the phenomenon: At what time of day does which type of crime occur where? Who exactly 
are the victims? With this information, individuals can always stay ‘one step ahead’. 107 
Compared to filing a police report and waiting for an official response, this process is ‘easier’ 
and ‘more intelligent’.108 Importantly, SWALK remains wedded to the idea of public security, 
i.e. to ‘reduc[ing] the number of crimes’.109 However, it attempts to do so without any 
hypotheses or theory on the causes of violent crime. What Big Data application like SWALK 
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promise is to access reality unmediatedly, without faulty speculations on causality. In fact, the 
ultimate fantasy is to generate insights without human analytical input at all. It is the 
algorithm which processes the data automatically and will eventually be able to define new 
categories, identifying more, previously invisible correlations.110 SWALK intends to visualize 
the dispersed, situated knowledge of individuals without reducing it to a pre-defined 
analytical framework. It traces urban life in real-time, providing individuals with an 
informational infrastructure to practice their own adaptive strategies. In this way, it can be 
seen as a sensing practice, discussed by Chandler.111 
The empirics of SWALK support the thesis that resilience tries to circumvent any analytical 
concepts, causal hypothesis and assumptions of its own. The SWALK example underscores 
how resilience does away with the neo-liberal notion of bounded rationality and its 
instrumental (re-) designing of incentives. It also demonstrates how resilience frees 
governmental discourse from the social analysis of deficient path dependencies and informal 
social practices that was so prominent in the Culture of Lawfulness approach. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has drawn out how the critique of modern liberal-universal episteme has 
transformed US policy discourse on drug-related organized crime in the Americas. The first 
section drew out how traditional US security policy followed the War on Drugs doctrine – a 
simplistic market model in which rationally calculating actors can be disincentivized from 
engaging in illegal activities through effective law enforcement. In this paradigm, US 
policymakers were openly pursuing their own preferences and imposing their own 
behavioural model. These were in a clearly visible governing position. This approach, 
however, is more and more perceived as out of touch with the world.  
As the second section demonstrated, narrowly conceived technical assistance is seen as 
neglecting underlying socio-cultural deficits in drug-producing and transiting countries. In 
consequence, US assistance programmes, like the Merida Initiative, have focused attention on 
empowering local communities, trying to turn them into law-abiding citizens. Importantly, 
neo-liberal policy initiatives, like the Culture of Lawfulness, are ambivalent about the 
governing position of external actors. On the one hand, the fact that international actors are 
imbued with context-insensitive liberal-universal assumptions, categories and theories makes 
them unfit to formulate locally legitimate and effective policy responses. On the other hand, 
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they are seen as uniquely competent in redesigning formal institutional processes and 
administrative structures. In this perspective, international interventions and the transitional 
processes they are meant to support will be successful if the informal, contextual knowledge 
of local actors connects productively with the technical expertise of international development 
managers, civil administrators and therapists. Here, international policy agency is mediated 
through local understandings and capacities. Crucially, while neo-liberal discourse 
underscores their value, it wants them to unfold within a specific normative horizon. Against 
this background, governmentality studies have argued convincingly that bottom-up neo-
liberal policy is, in fact, hierarchical and domineering.  
In contrast, resilience discourse tries to overcome the reductionist and top-down legacy of 
neo-liberal ownership. It does so by formulating an ‘alternative way of generating knowledge 
about violence’.112 Neo-liberal policy programmes, like the Culture of Lawfulness, see the 
value of local identities and histories from a purely instrumental point of view. They are 
resources for implanting liberal notions of the law, private property and state authority. 
Internationals engage with local communities with a clear intention to reform their attitudes 
and behaviour. Resilience discourse does not formulate its own analytical apparatus. The goal 
is to let previously hidden social practices and coping strategies come out in the open, so that 
they may be amplified and expanded. They key challenge of identifying and sustaining 
already existing practices is to undo the liberal baggage of international policy elites and their 
assimilated local partners. Thus, unearthing and supporting self-directed local processes 
involves an active role for international policymakers, rather than non-intervention. The 
central challenge is to facilitate local practices without manipulating them. In sum, resilience 
discourse seems to dissolve self-possessed international governance, while opening up an 
intensive work programme for thinking about how to do non-imposing facilitation. As one 
example of how this could be done in practice, the paper looked at the smartphone app 
SWALK. SWALK claims to work without causal hypotheses or theories, generating new 
insights purely by correlating statistically significant phenomena. The promise is that by 
avoiding an analytical framework new relations and patterns become visible. Similarly, by 
pooling and visualizing the dispersed, situated knowledge of many individuals Big Data 
application like SWALK allow people to pursue their own adaptive practices. This is a new 
governance practice which constantly discovers new correlations, without being able to 
properly explain them. This is a world full of previously hidden interconnections, but which 
remains essentially unintelligible. Instead of implementing a substantive policy programme, 
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the practice of governing is reduced to providing individuals with the infrastructure they need 
to pursue their own micro-adaptive strategies. While the normative goal of public security is 
still there, resilience thinking increasingly welcomes the world the way it is. 
